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One of the most important public policy debates in recent years has been
the reform of accounting standards toward “fair value” accounting. Financial
institutions, especially banks and insurance companies, have been at the
forefront of this debate and have been the most vocal opponents of this
reform. Judging from the intensity of the arguments and the controversy that
this reform has generated, there is clearly much more at stake than what may
appear to be esoteric measurement issues. We review the main strands of this
debate, and describe a framework of analysis that can weigh up the arguments
on both sides. Far from being an esoteric debate, issues of measurement
have a far reaching influence on the behaviour of financial institutions, and
determine to a large extent the eﬃciency of the price mechanism in guiding
real decisions.
The immediate cause of the recent fierce debates has been the initiative
of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the U. S. Fi-
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nancial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) toward greater convergence of
international accounting standards to one based more on the information
that are provided by prevailing market prices - sometimes known as a “fair
value” or “mark-to-market” reporting system (Hansen (2004)). This is in
contrast to a measurement system based on historical cost which requires
firms to record their assets and liabilities at their original prices with no
adjustments for subsequent changes in the market values of those items.
The reform toward greater marking to market has had many influential
champions. In testimony to U.S. House of representatives, Paul Volcker,
chairman of the Board of Trustees of the International Accounting Stan-
dards Committee, has stated that one of the fundamental conceptual issues
facing accounting regulators worldwide is the “extent to which standards
should move away from traditional cost based accounting to marking assets
and liabilities to market.....” (Volcker (2001)). Robert Herz, chairman of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board has argued that “for accounting to
better reflect true economic substance, fair value, rather than historical cost,
would generally seem to be the better measure.” (Herz (2003)). Others have
called the move to a fair value measurement system “the biggest shift in ac-
counting and financial reporting since standard setting was set up” (Williams
(2002)). Some in the popular press have gone further. One commentator
writes
“Maybe, if companies in the United States and Asia had mea-
sured all financial instruments at fair value, regulators, depos-
itors, and investors could have achieved greater regulatory and
market discipline and avoided some of the losses that investors
and taxpayers have had to pay during previous downturns in the
economy” (Day (2000)).
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However, arrayed against this formidable line-up has been an equally
formidable group of banks and insurance companies drawn from the major
industrialized countries, sometimes with the support of their prudential reg-
ulators. This group has waged an unprecedented joint lobbying campaign
to limit the application of the FASB and IASB reform to their industries.
For example, a joint international working group of banking associations (the
banking associations of the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the
European Union) has issued a paper stating that “users of banks’ financial
statements do not support a change to a full fair value accounting system
because a full fair value system does not provide a sound basis for providing
banking book net cash flows and lacks relevance” (JWGBA (1999)). Simi-
larly, a recent survey released by the Geneva Association indicates that there
is a broad consensus in the insurance profession for the view that “a full fair
value reporting system would have an adverse impact on the risk transfer
role that the insurance industry plays within the wider economic system”
(Geneva Association (2004)).
Banks and insurance companies accept that marking to market is de-
sirable for some items on the balance sheet -in particular for transactions
entered into with the objective of making a profit from short term price vari-
ations. Their opposition is to a full fair value reporting system in which
mark-to-market accounting should be applied uniformly to all assets and lia-
bilities. In particular, they are strongly opposed to marking to market items
such as long term loans and outstanding insurance claims that represent the
major proportion of their balance sheets.
The arguments used by both sides raise a number of fundamental ques-
tions concerning allocative eﬃciency and the information conveyed by finan-
cial statements. Proponents of marking to market argue that the market
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value of an asset is more relevant than historical cost because it reflects the
amount at which that asset could be bought or sold in a current transaction
between willing parties. Similarly, the market value of a liability is more
relevant than historical cost because it reflects the amount at which that
liability could be incurred or settled in a current transaction between willing
parties. A measurement system that reflects the market values of assets and
liabilities would therefore lead to better insights into the risk profile of firms
currently in place so that investors could exercise better market discipline
and corrective action on firm’s decisions.
Such an argument would be overwhelming in the context of completely
frictionless markets where market prices fully reflect the fundamental values
of all assets and liabilities. The benchmark results from economics - the
eﬃciency properties of competitive equilibria - could then be invoked, and no
further argument would be necessary. However, when there are imperfections
in the market, the superiority of a mark-to-market regime is no longer so
immediate. The relevant analogy here is with the theory of the second best
from welfare economics. When there is more than one imperfection in a
competitive economy, removing just one of these imperfections need not be
welfare-improving. It is possible that the removal of one of the imperfections
magnifies the negative eﬀects of the other imperfections to the detriment of
overall welfare. Thus, simply moving to a mark-to-market regime without
addressing the other imperfections in the financial system need not guarantee
a welfare improvement. In some cases, the market price may not be the “true
and fair” value of the asset.
Practitioners who have opposed marking to market have used three types
of arguments. First, they argue that the very definition of market value by
the FASB and the IASB assumes the existence of deep and liquid secondary
4
markets for their assets and liabilities. They note, however, that many the
assets and liabilities of financial intermediaries do not trade in liquid sec-
ondary markets. Furthermore, much of the relevant information possessed
by banks who originate a loan or insurers who underwrite a policy is “soft”
and would never be priced in a market. Marking to market would thus de-
crease rather than increase the reliability of a bank’s financial statements
(European Central Bank (2004)).
Second, mark-to-market accounting does not properly reflect the way in
which banks and insurance companies manage their core businesses of grant-
ing long term loans and underwriting insurance policies. The essence of
banking lies in taking long-term decisions about credit quality and concen-
tration and fostering customer relationships over the life of the contracts.
It is less concerned with short-term variations. Mark-to-market accounting
could therefore have adverse real eﬀects on banks and insurance companies’
core businesses by shortening their planning horizons (Geneva Association
(2004), JWGBA, (1999)).
Finally, opponents of marking to market argue that reliance on market
values for assets and liabilities runs the risk that the reporting standards will
induce excessive volatility in the markets. The volatility is excessive in the
sense that it is driven by short-term artificial fluctuations in financial market
valuations in addition to the fundamental volatility driven by fluctuations in
the riskiness of the financial institution’s long term cash flows. Marking to
market, it is argued, will result in artificial volatility in income because for
loans held to maturity, any deviations from cost will be gradually compen-
sated for during the life of the loan, “pulling the value to par” at maturity
(JWGBA (1999)).
It is important here to distinguish volatility of prices that merely reflect
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the volatility of the underlying fundamentals from volatility that cannot be
justified by these fundamentals. If the fundamentals themselves are volatile,
then market prices will merely reflect the underlying reality. However, the
“artificial” nature of the volatility refers to something more pernicious. Mar-
ket prices play a double-edged role. Not only are they a reflection of the
underlying fundamentals, but they also aﬀect the market outcome through
their influence on the actions of market participants. When the decision hori-
zon of market participants are shortened due to agency problems or other
market imperfections, then short term price fluctuations aﬀect the interests
of these market participants, and hence will influence their actions. There is
then the possibility of a feedback loop where anticipation of short term price
movements will induce market participants to act in such as a way as to
amplify these price movements. When such feedback eﬀects are strong, then
firms’ decisions are based on the second-guessing of others’ decisions rather
than on the basis of perceived fundamentals. In this sense, there is the dan-
ger of the emergence of an additional, endogenous source of volatility that
is purely a consequence of the accounting norm, rather than something that
reflects the underlying fundamentals Understanding the nature and sever-
ity of such eﬀects is the key to appreciating the causes of the controversy
surrounding the fair value reporting standards.
In spite of the intensity of the debate among practitioners, there has been
surprisingly little academic research on the conceptual analysis of the trade-
oﬀs between mark-to-market versus historical cost measurement policies.1
Our essay summarizes a recent paper of ours (Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2004))
1O’Hara (1993) is an exception. Using an asymmetric information model, she investi-
gates the eﬀect of market value accounting on loan maturity and finds that mark-to-market
results in a preference for short-term loans over long-term loans. However, the environment
that she models and the forces in her environment are very diﬀerent from ours.
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that attempts to set out such a framework.
The fundamental trade-oﬀ can be described as follows. The historical cost
regime relies on past prices, and so accounting values are insensitive to price
signals. This leads to one type of ineﬃciency arising from excessive conser-
vatism. By relying on past information, current decisions are distorted by
being insuﬃciently sensitive to movements in the underlying fundamentals.
Marking to market overcomes this excessive conservatism by relying on
current market prices, but it does so at the cost of distorting this informa-
tion. When the decision horizons of managers and market participants are
shortened due to various agency problems, the anticipation of future prices
aﬀects firms’ decisions nowwhich, in turn, injects artificial volatility to prices.
Knowing all this, the managers and market participants become even more
sensitive to short term price movements and are pushed to act in ways that
amplify these short term price movements. Even when the underlying funda-
mentals are relatively stable, the mutually reinforcing eﬀect of agents’ actions
can produce substantial fluctuations in prices that bear little resemblance to
the fundamentals.
An extreme form of such artificial volatility is the phenomenon of “liq-
uidity black holes”. Occasionally, financial markets experience episodes
of turbulence of such an extreme kind that they appear to stop function-
ing. Such episodes are marked by a heavily one-sided order flow, rapid price
changes, and financial distress on the part of many of the traders. The 1987
stock market crash is perhaps the most glaring example of such an episode,
but there are other, more recent examples such as the collapse of the dollar
against the yen on October 7th, 1998, and instances of distressed trading in
some fixed income markets during the LTCM crisis in the summer of 1998.
Practitioners dub such episodes “liquidity holes” or, more dramatically, “liq-
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uidity black holes” (Taleb (1997, pp. 68-9), Persaud (2001)).
Liquidity black holes are not simply instances of large price changes.
Public announcements of important macroeconomic statistics, such as the
U.S. employment report or GDP growth estimates, are sometimes marked
by large, discrete price changes at the time of announcement. However,
such price changes are arguably the signs of a smoothly functioning market
that is able to incorporate new information quickly. The market typically
finds composure quite rapidly after such discrete price changes, as shown by
Fleming and Remolona (1999) for the US Treasury securities market.
In contrast, liquidity black holes have the feature that they seem to gather
momentum from the endogenous responses of the market participants them-
selves. Rather like a tropical storm, they appear to gather more energy as
they develop. Part of the explanation for the endogenous feedback mecha-
nism lies in the idea that the incentives facing traders undergo changes when
prices change. Market distress can feed on itself. When asset prices fall,
some traders may get close to their loss limits and are induced to sell. But
this selling pressure sets oﬀ further downward pressure on asset prices, which
induces a further round of selling, and so on. Portfolio insurance based on
dynamic hedging rules is perhaps the best-known example of such feedback,
but similar forces will operate whenever traders face constraints on their be-
haviour that shorten their decision horizons. Daily loss limits and other
controls on traders’ discretion arise as a response to agency problems within
a financial institution, and are there for good reason. However, they have
the eﬀect of shortening the decision horizons of the traders.
The feedback eﬀect (in which selling pressure sets oﬀ further downward
pressure on asset prices) is made possible by the marking of positions to
market prices. The prices not only convey information about the world,
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they are also an imperative to action by the traders themselves. Thus, there
is not only a direction of causality from actions to prices, but there is also a
direction of causality from prices to actions. This completes the circle that
starts from prices to actions, back to prices. Liquidity black holes are but
the extreme case of this feedback eﬀect. The general mechanism is more
general, and operates pervasively.
For hedge funds and other financial institutions that deal mainly with
marketable financial assets, marking to market is the norm. The worry
about the new international reporting standards is that the hair-trigger be-
haviour of such institutions may spread to more traditional banking and in-
surance sectors by importing the potential for amplified responses to market
turbulence.
The theoretical analysis in Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2004) suggests that
potential harm done by reporting standards that enforce marking to market
depend on the following features.
1. The longer the duration of an asset, the more vulnerable it is to artificial
volatility. In particular, for suﬃciently long-lived assets, a historical
cost regime is superior to a mark-to-market regime. Conversely, for
shorter-lived assets, a mark-to-market regime dominates a historical
cost regime.
2. The more illiquid is the market for the asset, the more vulnerable it is
to artificial volatility. For those assets whose markets have a limited
absorption capacity for sales, a historical cost regime is superior to a
mark—to—market regime. Conversely, for those assets with suﬃciently
deep and liquid markets, mark—to—market is preferable.
3. Senior claims that have limited upside but a large downside risk are the
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most susceptible to artificial volatility in the mark-to-market regime.
Junior claims with a large potential upside but limited downside are
more plagued by the conservatism of the historical cost regime.
These findings shed some light on why the opposition to marking to mar-
ket has been led by the banking and insurance industries. For these finan-
cial institutions a large proportion of their balance sheets consists precisely
of items that are long duration, illiquid and senior. For banks, these items
appear on the asset side of their balance sheets. Loans, typically, are senior,
long-term and very illiquid. For insurance companies, the focus is on the lia-
bilities side of their balance sheet. Insurance liabilities are long-term, illiquid
and have limited upside from the point of view of the insurance company.
The modelling approach adopted in Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2004) is to
keep the details to a bare minimum, but with just enough richness to capture
these eﬀects. The study models the behaviour of financial institutions that
have acquired an asset in a primary market and face the decision whether
to hold it until maturity or oﬀ-load it in a secondary market, such as the
securitization market or the reinsurance market. There are three ingredients
that make such a decision problematic. First, the horizon of firms does not
match the duration of their assets. Second, the true value of the asset cannot
be contracted upon. Instead, the value of the firm can be measured only with
the prices of its assets, either the past price (historical cost regime) or the
current price (mark-to-market regime). Third, the secondary market for the
asset is illiquid - there is limited absorption capacity for sales. The limited
capacity of the market to absorb sales of assets has figured prominently in
the literature on banking and financial crises (see for example Allen and Gale
(2001) and Gorton and Huang (2003)). Finally, the buyers in the secondary
market are not able to extract the same full value as the originators - the
10
specific skills of banks is an important ingredient, as in Diamond and Rajan
(2000).
Under the historical cost regime, short-horizon firms find it optimal to sell
assets that have recently appreciated in value, since booking them at histori-
cal cost understates their worth. Despite a discount in the secondary market,
the inertia in accounting values gives these short horizon firms the incentives
to sell. Thus, the historical cost regime leads to excess conservatism-firms
have no incentives to exert their skills when it is the most valuable.
A natural remedy to this problem would be to shift to a mark-to-market
regime. This is only an imperfect remedy, however. The illiquidity of the
secondary market causes another type of ineﬃciency. A bad outcome for the
asset will depress fundamental values somewhat, but the more pernicious
eﬀect comes from the negative externalities generated by other firms selling.
When others sell, short term prices are depressed more than is justified by
the fundamentals, and exerts a negative eﬀect on all others, but especially
on those who have chosen to hold on to the asset. Anticipating this negative
outcome, short-horizon firms will be tempted to preempt the fall in price by
selling the asset itself. However, such preemptive action will merely serve
to amplify the price fall. In this way, the mark-to-market regime generates
endogenous volatility of prices that impede the resource allocation role of
prices. Using techniques that borrow from the recently developed theory of
“global games”, it is possible to characterize such artificial volatility as a
function of the underlying fundamentals.
In general, marking to market tends to amplify the movements in asset
prices relative to their fundamental values in bad states of the world. The
mark-to-market regime leads to ineﬃcient sales in bad times, but the histor-
ical cost regime turns out to be particularly ineﬃcient in good times. This
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is why the seniority of the asset’s payoﬀ (which determines the concavity of
the payoﬀ function) and the skewness of the distribution of the future cash
flows have an important impact on the choice of the optimal regime.
As the duration of assets increase, both regimes become more ineﬃcient.
However, the historical cost regime exhibits less ineﬃciency relative to the
mark-to-market regime. This is because the negative externality exerted by
other sellers becomes more severe when the duration of the asset increases,
and the firms’ actions are influenced more by the second-guessing of other
firms’ decisions.
This analysis highlights some key factors in the strategic interactions
between firms in the secondary market. Under the historical cost regime,
actions of the firms are strategic substitutes. Sales by the other firms drive the
market price down, which makes holding the asset booked at the acquisition
cost more desirable. Conversely, in the mark-to-market regime, firms’ actions
are strategic complements. The expectation of sales by the other firms makes
holding the asset less desirable because of an expected lowmarket value at the
reporting date. Strategic substitutability has a stabilizing eﬀect, so that the
market price is “artificially smooth” as compared to the true value of the asset
under the historical cost measurement regime. Strategic complementarity
adds endogenous volatility, so that the market prices are “artificially volatile”
as compared to the fundamental values in a marked-to-market economy.
These strategic eﬀects give a pivotal role to the liquidity of the secondary
market. In more illiquid markets, strategic concerns becomemore important.
As the market becomes more illiquid, strategic complementarity increases in
the mark-to-market regime, leading to greater incidence of sales and more
volatile prices. In the historical cost regime, increasing illiquidity has a dis-
ciplining eﬀect on firms because of increased strategic substitutability, and
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may therefore be Pareto improving for some values of the parameters.
The choice of an optimal measurement regime for financial intermediaries
is currently one of the most contentious and important topics for practition-
ers. We have sketched an economic analysis of this issue that illuminates the
reasons for the controversy. In an environment where the only contractible
valuations of assets are their prices in an illiquid market, measurement poli-
cies aﬀect firms’ actions, and these actions, in turn, aﬀect prices. Thus, prices
aﬀect measurements, but these measurements also have a feedback eﬀect on
prices. We have compared a measurement regime based on past price–
historical cost–with a regime based upon current price–mark-to-market.
The historical cost regime is ineﬃcient because it ignores price signals. This
leads to excess conservatism. However, in trying to extract the informational
content of current prices, the mark-to-market regime damages this content by
adding a purely speculative component to price fluctuations. As a result, the
choice between these measurement regimes boils down to a dilemma between
ignoring price signals, or relying on their degraded versions. The histori-
cal cost regime may sometimes dominate the mark-to-market regime when
assets have a long duration, trade in a very illiquid market, or feature an
important downside risk. These results help explain why the application of
the regulatory mark-to-market reforms to financial institutions have been so
contentious. A large proportion of the balance sheets of financial institutions
consists precisely of items that are of long duration, illiquid and senior.
Our results also suggest that there are winners and losers in the shift
to a full mark-to-market regime. When the financial system is populated
by those institutions who can potentially lose from the move (perhaps the
bank-diminated continental European financial systems), then the overall de-
sirability of the move to full mark-to-market accounting should be considered
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seriously. This is not to deny that such a transition is a desirable long-run
aim. In the long run, large mispricings in relatively illiquid secondary mar-
kets would likely trigger financial innovations in order to attract new classes
of investors. This enlarged participation would in turn enhance liquidity, a
situation in which our analysis shows that marking to market becomes more
eﬃcient. A natural route for future research is to endogenize market par-
ticipation and thus liquidity in our setup, so as to analyze how a careful
transition towards market-based measurements could trade oﬀ the costs we
have emphasized with the long-run benefits from a higher reliance on price
signals.
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